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INTRODUCTION
Historian Ellenberger (1970) has  identifi ed 
in the history of psychiatry and brain sci-
ence “the trend that consists in describ-
ing and understanding psychological and 
psychopathological phenomena in terms 
of real or hypothetical brain structures”, a 
trend he called a “brain mythology”. The 
rise of neuroscience in the last two decades 
has certainly given it a new signifi cance. It 
is clear that neuroscience is extending its 
territory toward psychosocial, moral and 
cultural attitudes. The neuroscientifi c ques-
tion “how does the human brain work?” 
has become more and more inseparable 
from the question “what does it mean to 
be human?” We may observe how contem-
porary neuroscience participates in the 
embodiment of the mind in the brain. Vidal 
(2009) calls “brainhood” the idea that “the 
brain is necessarily the location of the mod-
ern self ”. This historical and epistemological 
situation generates confl icting claims and 
controversies, which are the evidence of the 
tensed relationship among neuroscience, 
social sciences and humanities today.
Firstly, there is a tension between the 
neural and the social bases of the human 
mind (i.e. its competences, behaviours and 
attitudes) and there is a tension between 
individual identities and generic categories 
of people supposed to share neural con-
fi gurations. These controversies are closely 
linked to the development of brain imag-
ing as a possibility to visualize individual 
brain processes and construct cerebral types 
by subtracting and averaging imaging data 
(Posner and Raichle, 1994). They are also 
part of the history of understanding what 
being human means and of the confl ict 
between “free will” and “biological shaping”. 
This confl ict has been recently revived by 
the rise of neuroscience and by some social 
and political controversies related to the 
concepts of identity and personhood. In this 
short article, I would like to suggest that a 
more specifi c historical contextualization 
of these tensions and confl icts may help 
us to better understand the contemporary 
 epistemological debate between neuro-
science and social sciences.
READING HUMAN IDENTITIES IN 
WESTERN THOUGHT AND PRACTICES
Brain imaging constitutes one chapter of 
a longer history related to the embodi-
ment of mind, self and identity in Western 
thought. This could be illustrated by vari-
ous and often curious historical theories of 
this embodiment. For instance, the rather 
marginal work of Italian mathematician 
Cardano (1501–1576), otherwise known 
for his method for solving third degree 
equations. In his De Metoposcopia (writ-
ten in 1558 and published a century later; 
see Cardano, 1658) he proposes to read the 
identity and the destiny of men in their 
forehead wrinkles. He schematizes them as 
a seven-line staff on which planets inscribe 
their infl uence with marks in their fl esh. 
Cardano’s epistemic hypothesis stems from 
a long tradition of physiognomony, the art 
of reading human characters through simi-
larities with animals, formalized by Italian 
physician Della Porta (1535–1615). In his 
De Humana Physiognomonia (Della Porta, 
1586), he considers the human being as the 
“perfection of Creation” and as the conden-
sation of the diverse qualities that animals 
have. The particular likeness of an individual 
with an animal, according to Della Porta, is a 
sign of deviation from perfection and this is 
how an individual’s character is portrayed.
We obviously no longer believe in such an 
analogical conception of the world in which 
the purpose of knowledge was supposed to 
identify the connections between the move-
ments of the macrocosm (the universe) and 
the microcosm (men) both created by “The 
Divine Intelligence”. Nevertheless, from an 
epistemological point of view, these theories 
share a general structure with contempo-
rary theories, including brain imaging in 
neuroscience. These theories are charac-
terized fi rstly by a general conception of 
nature and of the human being; secondly, 
by a hypothesis of infl uence; thirdly, by 
the attempt to develop a practical technique 
that enables to read the signs that defi ne 
individual uniqueness.
These premodern theories on human 
characters help us to understand the his-
tory of identity embodiment as a series of 
debates about its location and its determi-
nations (in the skin, the face, the organs, 
and so forth). In this sense, one could say 
that neuroscience involves the same quest 
for location and determination, but it natu-
ralizes the shaping of identity and locates 
it in the brain. Whether identity is formed 
internally or externally has always been 
the controversial problem of determinism. 
This is particularly true for phrenology, a 
theory often presented as a “mistake” but 
that anticipated modern neuroscience. 
For Gall (1758–1828) “the exercise of our 
liking and our faculties, regardless of the 
principles we adopt, is subject to organic 
infl uence” (Gall, 1825). He acknowledges 
the infl uence of society and education on 
identity, but considers innate conditions to 
be the most determining:
“We must therefore admit that each ani-
mal, according to its organization, has 
received from nature industrial skills, 
instincts, inclinations, determined tal-
ents, and that the power of the things 
from outside, from the institution and 
the education is simply to make more or 
less modifi cations.” (Gall, 1825)
Psychiatrist Pinel (1745–1826), who 
commented on Gall’s work, was very scep-
tical about locating in the brain any “skills, 
instincts, [or] inclinations”, and even 
doubted that madness was located there. In 
his famous Traité médico-philosophique sur 
l’aliénation mentale (Pinel, 1809), he argued 
that except for “idiotism” it was impossible 
to link mental alienation with the shape of 
the skull or brain injuries, and stated that 
“The head of the insane is approaching, 
in this point of view, well-formed heads”. 
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an  overestimation of the signifi cance of 
results to seduce  scientifi c and popular 
media. But the problem could be deeper 
and could involve the epistemology that 
wants to reach the  scientifi c understand-
ing of “human nature”. This important and 
diffi cult question was formulated percep-
tively by French psychologist, philosopher 
and psychotherapist Janet (1859–1947). 
His 1924–1925 course at the Collège de 
France – where he occupied the chair of 
Experimental and Compared Physiology – 
was titled “A Study of Love and Hate”. The 
tone is sarcastic, but the argument is of 
particular relevance even today:
“The main reason for the failure of vis-
ceral theories of emotions is that these 
phenomena are extremely commonplace 
and are roughly the same for all emotions. 
[…] [T]hese theories are predicated on 
a methodological mistake consisting in 
moving from a very complicated phe-
nomenon to a very simple one, in this case 
from a feeling to a physiological change. 
This reminds me a candidate at an exami-
nation who was asked: ‘What is sodium 
sulphate?’ He answered: ‘It’s a compound 
of atoms’”. (Janet, 2005)
CONCLUSION
The brief outline of this historical debate 
draws our attention to the need for a more 
integrative approach to the understanding 
of complex human phenomena. In order 
to meet this challenge, one would probably 
need to summon the expertise of differ-
ent disciplines. Today, neuroscience, social 
sciences and humanities need to consider 
that disciplines do not exist per se, but are 
contingent and limited ways of knowing 
 reality and understanding real life prob-
lems. Scientifi c enquiries made on the 
complexity of what being human means 
need an open conceptual and technical 
scrutiny of methodologies, paradigms, 
data analysis and interpretative frame-
works. This requires a critical analysis of 
the tensions and controversies that put in 
opposition and defi ne scientifi c disciplines; 
it also requires the will of going beyond 
them, in particular by opening one’s own 
discipline to other “epistemic cultures” 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999). This is certainly 
what will characterize future research 
in neuroscience.
Following Morgagni (1682–1771), he 
admits that abnormalities in insane brains 
can be observed like “lymphatic effusions 
in the ventricles of the brain, congestion of 
blood vessels, changes in the choroid plexus 
and corpus callosum, small concretions 
calculated in the pineal gland, etc.” But he 
underlines that “it must be acknowledged 
that in other brains of insane, there is no 
such physical injury, no alteration in the 
structure of its parts”. Since he saw no essen-
tial relation between insanity and the brain, 
Pinel developed his “Moral Treatment”. 
Within the paternalist and philanthropic 
context of the time, this treatment con-
sisted in a benevolent caretaking in which 
patients were to develop behavioural and 
intellectual self-control under the guidance 
of the doctor.
Gall (1825) disagreed with Pinel:
“After he has painted after nature, and 
in vivid colours, the highest degree of 
imbecility, after reporting specifi cally on 
the smallness of the heads of these idi-
ots, in brief, after he has found the truth, 
Mr Pinel does not yet have the courage 
to seize it.”
Two centuries later, their disagreement 
is reminiscent of the tensions between 
psychiatry and neuroscience, and more 
generally of the controversies about the 
location of identity and the nature of 
its determinations. These tensions and 
controversies are not metaphysical, but 
result from contemporary techniques 
for neuroscientific investigation such as 
brain imaging.
READING “ENTITIES” AND/OR 
“IDENTITIES” INTO BRAINS
What does brain imaging show? From a 
technical and general point of view, the 
visualizing techniques like Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Positron 
Emission Tomography, Single Photon 
Emission Computed Tomography make 
visible anatomical confi gurations, dynam-
ics of metabolism through specifi c chemical 
tracers, cerebral spatialization of patterns 
of activities in experimental and/or clinical 
situations. Diffi culties arise when we try to 
process and interpret these data.
This can be illustrated by results obtained 
in neuroscience, which explicitly claim to 
demonstrate the “neural bases” of “social 
behaviours”, “emotions”, “intentionality” 
or “subjectivity”. For instance, Bartels and 
Zeki (2000) and Zeki and Romaya (2008) 
have tried to identify “Neural bases of 
romantic love” and “Neural correlates for 
hate”. The diffi culty emerged less from the 
experimental protocol (studies of cerebral 
states generated by stimulation) than from 
the interpretation of the brain images it pro-
duced. It consisted in transforming visual 
and spatial traces produced experimentally 
into ontologies:
“In summary, our results show that there 
is a unique pattern of activity in the brain 
in the context of hate. This pattern, while 
being distinct from that obtained in the 
context of romantic love, nevertheless 
shares two areas with the latter, namely 
the putamen and the insula. This link-
age may explain why love and hate are 
so closely linked to each other in life.” 
(Zeki and Romaya, 2008)
On the one hand, this kind of research 
follows the “psycho-physiological princi-
ple” reminded more than a century ago 
by Flournoy (1854–1921): “everything 
that happens in the soul has a physi-
cal correlation, and the determination 
of this  correlation is the ambition of any 
researcher” (Flournoy, 1901). But, on the 
other hand, the conclusion illustrates a cir-
cular hermeneutics. “Love” and “hate” are 
defi ned as “emotional states”. In the experi-
mental  protocol, these “emotional states” 
are converted into differential reactions 
to visual inputs. These differential reac-
tions are technically expressed into voxels 
spatialized in patterns. These patterns are 
interpreted as specialized subsystems of 
the brain. These subsystems are consid-
ered as physiological localizations of sub-
jective experiences. On the rhetorical level 
but not in the experimental design, these 
localizations “in the brain” are merged with 
emotional phenomenology “in life”. At the 
end of the process, “love” and “hate” are 
transformed in “biological sentiments”, in 
authors’ own words.
Of course, researchers sharing this 
hermeneutics and developing this rheto-
ric are not necessarily naïve. We know 
that the highly competitive market of 
scientifi c publishing tends to provoke 
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